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Authority and Legitimacy in the Formation of the Latin 
American States 
Robert H. Holden 
Old Dominion University 
Introduction 
When observed against the worldwide panorama of state formation, the 
states of Latin America compose a group with two salient features. The 
first is a crisis of order and legitimacy. The second is the exceptionally 
long duration of that crisis, which began in 1808 with the collapse of the 
Spanish monarchy. On close inspection, irregularities in the depth, char-
acter and timing of the crisis appear; for example, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay continue to stand apart for their relatively more peaceful, 
democratic, stable and law-abiding ways. Still, across Latin America, 
the high expectations raised in the 1980s . by the nearly uniform shift 
away from military rule and the tumultuous populisms of previous 
decades, toward more stable and democratic forms of governance, have 
largely been disappointed. Lawless violence, impunity and the rule of 
elected but inept and corrupt governments - some of whom have already 
summoned back to life the old authoritarian habits - persist almost 
everywhere. 
No one is more aware of the protracted nature of the crisis of order 
and legitimacy, or laments it more, than Latin Americans themselves. 
"Our States are sclerotic and hypertrophic, incapable of satisfying the 
needs of our peoples and of providing the fruits that democracy is 
obligated to deliver," declared Oscar Arias, the retiring president of 
Costa Rica at yet another summit meeting of Latin American heads of 
state in 2010. Mocking the high-level chatter about democracy and 
development that prevails at such meetings, and criticizing the intelli-
gentsia's fondness for sterile theories of the region's "eternal victimiza-
tion," Arias pointed out that Latin America had advanced little in 
recent decades, and in some ways had even fallen behind, particularly 
in three crucial dimensions of state formation: the construction of 
reliable institutions, respect for the rule of law and bureaucratic effect-
iveness. His speech was a short, blunt version of the conclusions about 
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the region's "crisis of governability" that the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) reached in its massive 2004 study of Latin 
American democracy. 1 
What accounts for Latin America's general failure .to govern itself 
according to the constitutional norms its leaders have habitually pro-
claimed? No matter how we choose to classify the symptoms of distress-
whether as problems of order, legitimacy, institutional effectiveness or 
governability - they all point to some fundamental deficiency in the 
state formation process, toward the existence of what Guillermo 
O'Donnell has called a "severe incompleteness of the state" that seems 
to have become even more prominent since the period of democratic 
consolidation began in the 1980s. 2 Accordingly, few items on the 
research agenda of the historian of Latin American state formation 
seem more urgent than the twofold problem of accounting for both 
the source of the legitimacy-order crisis, and its remarkable persistence. 
In pursuit of that goal, the section that follows will both suggest 
a procedural approach to the problem and identify the distinguishing 
characteristics of the Latin American state. The next section will offer 
reasons for rejecting as inapplicable the so-called bellicist theory 
of state growth as an explanation for those characteristics. The 
third section will argue for the relevance of two neglected spheres of 
state making, authority and legitimacy. Finally, I will proffer an alter-
native explanation for the Latin American state's longtime failure to 
thrive that emphasizes the centrality of beliefs about authority and 
legitimacy. 3 
1 Oscar Arias Sanchez, "Que cada palo aguante su vela" (Republica de Costa Rica, 
Presidencia de la Republica , 2010). Arias spoke with some authority . Nearing the end 
of his second (non-consecutive) term as president, he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1987 for having piloted Central America out of the region-wide war that engulfed it in the 
l 980s, during his first period as president (1986-90) . For the UNDP study, see Programa 
de las Naciones Unidas para el Desru.Tollo, La democracia en America Latina: Hacia una 
democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos (New York: Prograi.na de las N aciones U nidas para 
el De sarrollo, 2004). Similar confessions of failure can be found in Cumbres 
lberoamericanos de Jefes de Estado y de Gobiemo, Declaracion de Vina . Del Mar, 
November 7-11, 1996, www.segib.org/documentos.php; and in Organization .· of 
American · States, Convencion lnt eramericana Contra la Corrupcion, March 29, 1996, 
www.oas.org/JU1idico/spanish/Tratados/b-58.html, in which the signatories agreed to 
"consider" taking steps aimed at adopting "norms of conduct for the correct, honorable 
and proper observance of public functions ." 
2 Guillemio A. O'Donnell, "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: 
A Partial Conclusion," 1n: Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Paulo Sergio 
Pinheiro (eds.), The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (Notre 
Dru.ne, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 314. 
3 For another appeal to the relevance of legitimacy in state-making, see the chapter on the 
•Middle East in this volume by Dietrich Jung. 
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What Is the Latin American State? 
Turning first to the theoretical literature on state formation, we find at 
the center of that work the epochal contributions of Charles Tilly, a 
specialist in the history and sociology of the early modern and modern 
periods of Europe . Writing toward the end of his career, in the mid-
1990s, Tilly described his research program as a "historically embedded 
search for deep causes operating in variable combinations, circum-
stances, and sequences with consequently variable outcomes" (emphases 
added). For good measure, he went on to condemn the "invariant 
thinking" that had produced so many useless transhistorical models - a 
method, he wrote, "doomed to eternal failure." The historical problems 
to which Tilly had dedicated his career to investigating - collective 
action, social revolution and state formation - drew him into "big struc-
tures, large processes, and huge comparisons," to quote the lighthearted 
title of one of his books. What Tilly therefore seemed to be promising 
anyone in search of the "deep causes" of state formation - the theme of 
this collection - is variability on a vast scale in both process and out-
come. 4 Given both the grandeur and ubiquity of variability, the question 
is how to · handle it. In two short paragraphs, Tilly recommended a 
threefold procedure. Start with "plausible •Ontologies - representations 
of what is to be explained in terms of a given process's boundedness, 
continuity, plasticity, and complexity." Second, specify the relevant 
"fields of variation" or the way that the sources, processes, forms and 
outcomes of, say, state formation, relate to a variety of other phenomena. 
Finally, a "valid" analysis ought to end up with some "principles of 
variation" that apply to different aspects of the problem. As always, Tilly 
did not fail to acknowledge the difficulties and uncertainties awaiting 
researchers inclined to follow his advice - there was, he warned, "plenty 
of work to do. "5 
Following Tilly, I will begin by offering a brief "plausible ontology" of 
the states of Latin America. Then, in proceeding to his second step, I will 
concentrate on two "fields of variation" - first, war making, and second, 
the interrelated problems of authority and legitimacy. In · a nutshell, 
I intend to reject the first as scarcely relevant, and hold up the second 
as a cardinal component of any explanation of Latin America's govern-
ability crisis. The procedural method is Tilly's, but if there is a "general 
4 Charles Tilly, "To Explain Political Processes," The American Journal of Sociology, vol. l 00, 
no . 6 (May 1995), pp. 1594-1610, here atpp. 1595, 1600, 1602; idem, BigStructu111s, Large 
Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984). · · 
5 Tilly, "To Explain Political Processes," pp . 1605- 6. 
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theory" behind what follows, it would be that of "multiple modernities," 
as elaborated primarily by S. I. Eisenstadt and Charles Taylor . As the 
civilization of modernity swept beyond Europe, it created possibilities 
distinct from those in Europe. The result, according to Eisenstadt: 
"A great variety of modern or modernizing societies" that shared many 
features but that also revealed striking differences as a result of those 
societies' particular responses to modernity and their continued inter-
action with it. Modernity's spread beyond Europe entailed, therefore, 
not wholesale adoption, · but "the continuous selection, reinterpretation 
and reformulation" of modernity's norms as well as the emergence of 
distinctive institutions. 6 A clear case of such "reformulation," I argue, is 
the Latin American state. It is true that one can find distinct trajectories 
of state making within Latin America, as already noted · in the first 
paragraph of this essay, but they took plac·~ along a larger path that clearly 
diverged from, say, the western European or 'the North Atlantic path, as 
will be seen below. In its insistence on the continuous reinterpretation 
and adaptation of modernity's cultural program, Eisenstadt's theory 
coincides with Tilly's own suppositions about variation. 
Let us begin by improving Tilly's definition of the state, which he 
called "a distinct organization that controls the principal concentrated 
means of coercion within a well-defined territory, and in some respects 
exercises priority over all other · organizations operating within the 
same territory." 7 This definition only implies an end or purpose that 
ought to be made explicit, which I would do by adding that the state's 
end is always to abate disorder by creating a system of laws not subject 
to any other power. 8 Tilly refers to this aspect of the state only 
obliquely ("and in some respects exercises priority over all other 
organizations"), probably because he was operating in the modern 
European arena, where it could be taken for granted. As we have 
6 S. N. Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizar:ions and Mufaple Modernities, vols. 1 & 2 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003), 2:520-2. Similarly, Charles Taylor noted that modernity can only be 
understood in the · plural, in terms of the diverse "self-understandings" or multiple 
"social imaginaries" that have constitmed modernity; Charles Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 1-2. 
7 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capii:al and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), pp. 130- 1. · 
8 My definition is a compound of F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts & Co., 
1966), pp. 16-17, 21; and Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, The Notion of the State: An 
Introduction to Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 96. We could step 
back still further and consider Oakeshott's distinction between a state understood as a 
lordly "managerial apparatus" (universitas) or as a free "association of human beings" 
(societas), and his argument that both views have been "contingently joined by the choices 
of human beings in the character of a modern European state"; Michael Oakeshon, On 
Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 323. 
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already seen, however, order is not an end that can be taken for 
granted in the Latin American state-building context; _ 
At the outset, therefore, we would have to concede that the primary 
attribute of quite a few Latin American states has been their lack of 
achievement as states, for in their quest to abate · disorder, they . have 
manifestly failed. In most of the Central American countries, as well as 
generally in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, · Peru, Venezuela and periodic-
ally almost everywhere else, we see continuing signs of the world's oldest 
crisis of independence - 202 years, as of this writing, and showing little 
sign of easing. ·IfTilly's calling was .to explain the success of certain states 
in the North Atlantic world, it has fallen to others to try to explain the 
historic feebleness arid inferiority of their Latin American imitators. Over 
time, their failure has expressed itself in numerous ways ---' in the more or 
less constant agony of reorganization, the fugacious loyalty of a congeries 
of fighting forces, the indignity of not possessing the legitimacy required 
for an authoritative system of laws to command widespread obedience. 
l have tried elsewhere to explain these qualities, with particular atten-
tion to the five states of Central America, by holding up what I called 
these states' "improvisational character." 9 Their well-known inclination 
toward instability, I wanted to point out, was rooted in a commitment to 
the habitual reassembly of the state apparatus itself, on a pro tempore basis, 
out of the labor of a melange of collaborators, including regional caudillos 
(roughly, warlords or political bosses) and their followers, municipal-
level authorities and strongmen and, later, the armed forces or factions of 
the armed forces. This constant need among state makers to attract and 
maintain allies made the state's officeholders much more than a mere 
government, for . they were essentially reorganizers of the state itself. 
Nowhere was that reorganizational task more evident than in the prim-
ordial requirement of every new government to attract and hold the 
loyalty of the fighting forces to which it owed its rise to constitutional 
office, and the concomitant need to kill off, buy off or otherwise co-opt 
anyone capable of mobjlizing an opposing force. The significance of this 
fact .goes well beyond a simple computation of relative troop strength at 
the disposition of the contenders. For it was not the capacity or strength 
of the state's incumbents vis-a-vis its opponents that mattered as much as 
the certain knowledge among the subjects of the state that the state itself 
was not the ultimate power holder. In short, real sovereignty was held by 
9 
· Robert H. Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and Staie Formation in Cemra/ 
America, 1821-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch, I, pp. 25-8; idem, 
"Constructing the Limits of State Violence in Central America: Towards a New _Research 
Agenda," Journal of Latin American Studies, voL 28, no. 2 (May 1996). 
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whatever fighting forces had won the last battle or could plausibly 
threaten tl1e incumbents. Chronically improvisational, such states could 
scarcely expect to apply their legislative dispositions except by violence, 
owing to the fact that they were not perceived as . either the legitimate or 
even the ultimate source of the power required to enforce compliance. It 
was therefore frequently expedient for the nominal subjects of these 
nominal governments to bargain independently with various fighting 
entities instead of with . the government itself. 10 
Over time, · the symptoms of improvisationalism changed. Outright 
warfare among rival caudillos for control of the state had faded in most 
of Latin America by the late nineteenth century, though in some places 
such as Central America it continued well into . the twentieth century. 
Rival party militias under the command of their respective caudillos 
contested the Costa Rican civil war of 1948, obeying a pattern that also 
graced the politics of Honduras and Bolivia, among others, into the 
1950s. What persisted almost everywhere, with a diversity of manifest-
ations, were the particularisms of a patrimonial political culture in which 
expressions of power remained tied, not to institutions of state, but to 
individual strongmen or their organizations. 
A second feature of the "plausible ontology" that Tilly called for 
follows from the first. Recall that taxation/extraction (Tilly applies the 
terms interchangeably) was one of the three corners of Tilly's triangu-
lar model of interactive state making (the other two being war making 
and capital accumulation). 11 But in most of Latin America we have 
not often seen "states" engaged in an unqualified way in the collection 
of revenue for state-building purposes. For the most part, state makers 
have been predatory rent seekers dependent on clientelistic networks 
to distribute plunder and dispense violence. The last attribute has 
probably lost some of its validity over the last two or three decades, 
but it is by no means irrelevant even today; in fact, it is a fair descrip-
tion of political life in Guatemala in 2010, where huge personal for-
tunes stand to be made by state agents who avoid taxation/extraction 
and who subvert the state's responsibility for maintaining order. 12 
10 Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 25-6. 
11 Tilly, Big Structures, p. 141; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 
in: Peter B .. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds. ), Bringing the State 
Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-91, here at p. 172. 
12 For many people in Latin America, especially in countries such as Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and parts of Mexico and Brazil, power over their lives has been routinely 
exercised for generations by shadowy, composite "governments" of politicians, 
gangsters, · soldiers and wealthy entrepreneurs who pact, divide, compete, make war 
and realign under conditions of total unaccountability . For Guatemala, Ivan Briscoe 
magisterially synthesized the evidence in "A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in 
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Grzymala-Busse pointed out the importance of distinguishing between 
the capture of resources by the state (Tilly's idea) and the capture of 
resources by state agents. She observed that because predatory regimes 
"deliberately weaken state institutions," they have the weakest states 
and they tend to be more personalistic. 13 Predation and personalism 
remain well-known features of the patrimonial values underlying Latin 
American state formation, and highly congruent with the region's 
equally notorious inconsistency in applying the rule of law. 
Finally, the continuity of state incompetence ("fragility" appears to be 
the favored euphemism at the moment), including the violence that has 
always seemed to accompany the patrimonial political culture of the 
region, has to be recognized. A 2007 UN report on the five states of 
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) described them as places where "violence appears to be 
endemic" and the rule of law practically nonexistent. Levels of general 
violence, homicide rates and kidnapping for ransom were among the 
highest in the world, having actually risen since the regional wars ended 
there in the early 1990s. State agents, including those charged with 
maintaining lawful order, routinely collaborate with the non-state per-
petrators of criminal violence. 14 In Brazil, an investigator observed in 
2000, "The first and most basic issue in the next decade for government 
and civil society is to cope with lawless violence." The systematic viola-
tion of rights has been "a trademark of Brazilian political history" atleast 
since the end of the empire, in 1889. 15 In Rio de Janeiro, dealers in illegal 
drugs since at least 2000 have become a "new type of political actor" by 
building "mediated links into the state not just to obtain resources but 
also to gain access to the state power that facilitates their ongoing crim-
inal activities." 16 During Argentina's December 2001 wave of looting 
and vandalism, police and other state agents maintained their reputation 
Guatemala," working paper no. 88 (Madrid: Fundaci6n para · las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2009) www.fride.org/publication/658/the-state-
and-security-in-guatemala. 
13 Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State 
Formation," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 4/5 (April/May 2008), pp. 638-73, 
here atp. 639. 
14 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in Central America: 
Caught in the Crossfire (New York: United Nations, May 2007), p. 17, passim; Briscoe, 
"A Criminal Bargain," pp. 10-11. 
15 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, "Democratic Governance, Violence, and the (Un)Rule of Law," 
Daedalus, vol. 129, no. 2 (2000), pp. 119-43, here at p. 139. 
16 Enrique Desmond Arias, "The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social 
Order in Rio De Janeiro," Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 2006), 
pp. 293-325, here at p. 298. 
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for lawless violence by collaborating with the looters. 17 In Mexico in 
2009 alone, the police and the army confronted each other more than 65 
times, guns drawn and sometimes exchanging gunfire, as the army 
sought to collar drug smugglers within the ranks of the police, even 
though high-ranking army officers (along with officials of the federal 
prosecutor's office) themselves were also found working with drug smug-
glers.18 Latin America's 140,000-plus homicide deaths per year are twice 
the world's average, making it the most violent region in the world after 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 19 Democracy remains a distant prospect. "Power 
has not been dispersed; corruption persists or has worsened; and politics 
continues to be characterized by personalistic exchange relationships, 
lack of accountability, wide executive discretion, and absence of the rule 
oflaw." 20 
Looking back on the three features of the Latin American state just 
proposed, it seems clear that quite a few countries qualify as places where 
the prevailing ethos is "parapolitical," recently defined by a group of 
scholars as situations in which criminals act like sovereigns, and sover-
eigns act like criminals in a systematic but clandestine way. Individuals 
associated with the state - especially those responsible for security and 
intelligence operations - work closely with criminal elements to subvert 
formal constitutional procedures, while relying on contraband trade and 
acting autonomously within the political system for criminal purposes. 21 
In Latin America, this is hardly a new phenomenon; what I have called 
elsewhere the "parainstitutional" agents of public violence have been 
(I tried to show) deeply rooted features of Latin America's state forma-
tion process. 22 
17 Javier Auyero, "The Political Makings of the 2001 Loo tings in Argentina," Journal ·of 
Latin American Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 241-65; Laura Kalmanowiecki, 
"Origins an.d Applications of Political Policing in · Argentina," Lalin American 
Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 2 (March 2000), pp. 36-56 . 
18 Julie Watson and Olga R. Rodriguez, "In Northern Mexican [sic], Soldiers Increasingly 
Suspicious of Often Corrupt Police in Drug War," Associated Press, Nov~mber 9, 2009; 
Marc Lacey, "In Mexico, Sorting Out Good Guys From Bad," New York Times, 
November 2, 2008. 
19 Alessandra Heinemann and Dorce Verner, Crime and Violence in Development: 
A Literature Review of Lalin America and the Caribbean (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper no . 4041, 2008), pts. l, 2, 5. 
20 Judith Teichman, "Merging the Modem and the Traditional: Market Reform in Chile 
and Argentina," Comparative Politics, vol. 37, no . 1 (October 2004), pp. 23-40, here at 
p. 23. 
21 Robert Cribb, "Introduction: Parapolitics, Shadow Governance and Criminal 
Sovereignty," in: Eric Wilson (ed.), Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and 
Criminal Sovereignty (London; New York: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 8. 
22 Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 14- 15 and throughout. 
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What Can War Explain about Latin American 
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Turning to Tilly's second task, that of specifying the relevant "fields of 
variation," I would like to begin by weighing the variable in state forma-
tion that Tilly made famous -war. As European states engaged in wars to 
defeat internal rivals and to repulse or devour external ones, they grad-
ually · monopolized· war making, a process that required huge outlays of 
resources and thus forced the states, in varying degrees, to bargain with 
their subjects or soon-to-be citizens, Tilly wrote. Over time, in return for 
more and more rights, including those of consent and representation, 
plus the imposition of certain limits on the state's authority over them, 
citizens gradually paid more taxes, allowed themselves to be drafted into 
fighting nationalistic and patriotic wars and accepted the central author-
ity's abridgement of local rule. "Capital-intensive" and "coercion-inten-
sive" states followed distinctive paths in this process of negotiation, but 
everywhere, "bargaining over the state's extractive claims produced 
rights, privileges, and protective institutions that had not previously 
existed. "23 Considering the centrality of that argument to the theme of 
this collection, I think it is worth recalling the modesty, even self-
disparagement that accompanied Tilly's presentation of his "war makes 
states" proposition and its many derivatives and elaborations. "The 
argument brings with it few illustrations and no evidence worthy of the 
name," .he wrote; and again, the argument is "very, very crudely" stated 
and "may well be wrong. I certainly provided no evidence here for its 
correctness." 24 Others have questioned the validity of Tilly's model even 
for Europe itself. 25 
For the Latin American case, let us begin with Miguel Centeno's 
splendid study of the relationship between war making and state making, 
an explicit attempt to test Tilly's proposition that war makes states. In 
Latin -America generally, Centeno observed, "state power has always 
been shallow and contested" in contrast to Asian and European states. 
Why? Hypothesizing, with Tilly, that a history of big international wars 
makes states rich and powerful and even ties them more firmly to the 
majority of its _ inhabitants, Centeno argued that just because Latin 
23 Tilly, Coercian, pp. 9-10, 68-9, 94, 100---4. Also see idem, Big Structures, pp. 9- 10. 
24 Tilly, "War Making and State Making," p . 170; idem, Big Siructures, pp. 142, 143. 
25 Graeme Gill's finely honed summary of the evidence against Tilly concludes that while 
war may have stimulated the growth of state bureaucracies and their · tax-collection 
capacities, factors other than war -were at least as important, and sometimes war 
mattered very little; The Nature and Development of the Modern State (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 154-8 . 
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American states so rarely engaged in big international wars, they have 
remained comparatively weak, underdeveloped and incompetent : "The 
geopolitical tendency toward peace and the underdevelopment of 
the state are closely linked." But why didn't the Latin American state 
fight big international wars? "Because it did not form sophisticated 
political institutions capable of managing wars. No states, no wars." 
Thus, on this view, it takes competent states to make big war. But it also 
takes big wars to make . competent states, for international peace 
''deprived the [Latin American) states ofa potentially important impetus 
for development." The argument is explicitly circular, for it states that 
the reason states did · not go to war was because they were too weak and 
disorganized to do so. And the reason that they stayed weak is because 
they did not go to war. Besides making them unfit to fight big wars, the 
incompetence of these states had another consequence: it made them 
incapable of preventing internal conflict, and as a result, civil war and 
political violence became almost routine. 26 Evidently, then, the appro-
priate question is, "Why were the Latin American states weak and 
incompetent to begin · with?" for this is · the condition that explains why 
they supposedly avoided big wars in the first place, and presumably why 
they continued to avoid big wars while confronting serious political 
violence within their own borders . Centeno acknowledged as much, a 
point I will return to in due course. 
While Centeno excluded the Central American countries from his 
analysis of Latin America, he nevertheless observed that they represented 
unspecified "important exceptions" to his arguments .2 7 Now I would 
like to undertake my own test of Tilly's proposition by focusing on the 
Central American states, emphasizing three points. First, as I have 
argued elsewhere, "war" needs to be broadened into "public violence" 
in order to capture more accurately the reality of this aspect of state 
formation. The modern association of "war" with organized (and over-
whelming) violence between nation-states with clearly defined borders 
would limit and even distort the reality of violent conflict on the isthmus 
over the last two centuries. Of course "wars" in the . plain sense of the 
26 Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debi: War and ihe Nation-Srate in Latin America 
(Un iversity Park : Penn State University Press , 2002 ), pp . 20-6 , 265- 9, 271. Both 
Centeno's characterization of Latin America as a region that has avoided large-scale 
international war since independence, and his explanation, were challenged by Jorge 
I. Dominguez, who argued that the Latin American "peace" only began in 
the late . ninete enth century, and was owing to internati onal factors including the 
maintenance ·of a South American balance of power . Jorge I. Domingue z, Boundary 
Dispuces in Latin America (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 
p. 20 , passim . 
27 Centeno, Blood and Debr, 1, n. l. 
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word did take place but they can best be understood within the larger 
perspective conveyed by "public violence" ~ the killing, maiming and 
destruction that take place within the field of state power, engaging not 
only agents of the state· but their collaborators and rivals - including 
criminal gangs, death squads, party militias, vigilantes and twentieth-
century guerrilla "armies of national liberation. "28 Second, in compari-
son to the rest ofLatin America, the isthmus has probably endured more 
public violence than any other country or area of the region. 29 Third, few 
episodes of public violence in Central America have · been devoid of 
strong international dimensions, often including the direct participation 
of forces of various kinds from neighboring isthmian countries (as well as 
the United States from time to time), so that almost all strife even when 
contained within the borders of a single country can usually be con-
sidered international in scope. As a result, it cannot be said that Central 
America has been lacking in international violent conflict. 
In short, the Central American countries have sustained nearly two 
centuries of intense state-associated violence - almost all of it with strong 
international aspects - and yet can still claim to have some of the most 
feeble and incompetent states in all of Latin America. Even the Cold 
War period's fusion of internal and external threats associated with 
communism did little to enhance state capacity, for the build-ups that 
occurred were almost entirely confined to military and other security-
related functions, rather than, say, any significant gain in "extractive" 
capacity or in levels of accountability to a newly empowered citizenry. 
Moreover, they were paid for by a resource-rich ally, the United States. 
When the threat of communism faded in the late .1980s, and the military 
more or less submitted itself to civilian rule, the state as a whole 
remained weak and ineffective. Whatever gains to state effectiveness 
may have been owing to international conflict elsewhere, it sapped state 
effectiveness in Central America, further impoverishing their inhabitants 
while whittling away at what little legitimacy might be attributed to the 
state. In Central America, we see inept states bufno lack of internation-
ally oriented conflict. State incompetence cannot therefore be explained 
by the absence of international conflict in Central America - a place that, 
as Lindo-Fuentes put it, war had already become a "way of life" within 
the first two decades of independence. 30 
28 For more on "public violence" as a concept see Holden, Armies without Nations, 
pp. 9-24. 
29 Holden, Armies without Nations, pp. 28-9. 
30 Hector Lindo-Fuentes, Weak Foundations: The Economy of El Salvador in the Nineteenth 
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 48. 
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Costa Rica is the one exceptional Central American state - for 
its comparative capacity, stability, legitimacy and achievements in 
extending the benefits of social democracy. These are characteristics 
that even set it apart from most other countries in Latin America. Like 
its isthmian neighbors, Costa Rica's public violence has invariably been 
strongly international in character, involving alliances as well as strife 
with the fighting forces of other states. On the other hand, by the 1920s, 
Costa .Rica had allowed its armed forces to shrink to the point that the 
national military establishment could be abolished after the 1948 civil 
war with scarcely a word of dissent, and replaced with a national 
gendarmerie. Tilly's dictum would suggest "no military, so no war, and 
therefore no state." But this is exactly the opposite of Costa Rica's 
experience. Having abolished its national military establishment, Costa 
Rica became a comparatively successful state, so that success could no 
more be said to be the result of international conflict and militarization 
than could the failure of the other four countries of Central America:3 1 
Costa Rica is a successful state, and the others are failures or near-
failures. Yet all have regularly had to confront internationalized vio-
lence, though Costa Rica for most of the last century has carried on 
without a regular military establishment. 
In Central America, as in much of the rest of Latin America, war and 
the threat of war cannot therefore be said to have exercised a strongly 
independent influence . on the course of state formation except to further 
debilitate already-decrepit states. They were born weak, unstable, coer-
cive, quasi-legitimate and incompetent, and - with the few exceptions 
already noted - they stayed that way. The Tillyesque idea that a certain 
relationship between "war" and "the state" exerted an independent effect 
on the formation of the state should be discarded, for Latin America at 
large and the Central American region in particular. 
When Is a State or Government "Legitimate"? 
In the conclusion of his book, Centeno left a provocative clue to a very 
different explanation for state feebleness in Central America and else-
where in Latin America. He observed that war can only contribute to 
state making among states that are reasonably well organized to begin 
with. Europe enjoyed these preconditions for successful state making -
and thus war making - but Latin America did not. As a result, Latin 
3 1 This finding - that war sometimes didn't make viable states, and that viable states could 
arise without war - parallels Gill's criticism of Tilly for Europe; Gill, The Nature and 
Development of the Modern State, pp. 154-8. 
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American countries were not prepared to fight big wars, so they didn't. 
War, Centeno concluded, was little more than an "accelerating mech-
anism for a process that had its origins somewhere else [ emphasis added]." 
But just where is that "somewhere else"? For the deep causes of diverse 
state-formation processes, the place to go, Centeno asserted, is "the very 
problem of political authority and order," for states. probably cannot 
come into being "where no authority has previously existed." Centeno 
divided "authority and order" into two components, both of which Latin 
America lacked: "organization" and a socio-cultural congruence between 
states and the communities they sought to dominate. 32 Ending up by 
rejecting the Tilly dictum as inapplicable in Latin America, Centeno 
therefore suggested but did not develop .an alternative hypothesis for 
state incompetence. 
The rest of this essay takes over where Centeno left off, by proposing to 
analyze authority as an alternative "field of variation" that could be 
helpful in understanding diverse state-formation outcomes. However, 
in a flagrant departure from the conventional use of the term "authority," 
I refer, not to the one who holds power (potestas) but rather to the 
authoritative source (auctoritas) of a norm or moral principle, in this case 
norms or principles that can be applied to test the legitimacy of a regime 
or government. My main guide here is the work of the late Alvaro D'Ors, 
the Spanish jurist for whom the key to understanding human organiza-
tion of any kind could be found in the fundamental character of the 
distinction between potestas and auctoritas. Legitimacy (legitimus) derives 
from law (lex), implying that power exercised under the law is legitimate 
power. "Law" in this context implies more than mere "legality" (i.e., 
positive law enunciated by some social collectivity) but a more perman-
ent law, one that does not depend on a social contract but on principles 
of natural or divine law, as well as the rational requirements of scientific 
knowledge. Such is the "authority" that confers legitimacy. Yet this 
authority cannot be effective unless it is socially recognized, perhaps by 
way of state-established courts of justice, the voice of a widely respected 
individual, certain institutions independent of the state, or religious 
authorities. Hence I refer to "legitimating authority" (i.e., an authority 
according to which legitimacy is rightfully weighed) rather than to 
the more conventional "legitimate authority" (i.e., a power holder con-
sidered to be legitimate). 
32 Centeno, Blood and Debt, pp. 106-7, 275-8. Centeno added that war can make states 
only when "some form of union" emerges between state institutions, on the one hand, 
and a particular social class, but this condition has been fulfilled numerous times in 
certain countries without any discernible impact on state competence. 
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So, on D'Ors' view, the role of authority is never to exercise power but 
to speak to power. Authority is always counterposed to power. The role 
of power is to seek the approval of authority but never to claim it for itself, 
for to do so would be to exceed its natural limits. And like authority, 
power too must be "socially recognized," though the most influential 
factor in the social recognition of power will be whether or not it has 
received the assent of authority. D'Ors encapsulated his argument about 
the distinction between authority and power in two now-famous aphor-
isms: La autoridad es el saber socialmente reconocido y la postestad es, pre-
cisamente, el poder socialmente reconocido ("Authority is socially recognized 
knowledge, and power is precisely socially recognized power"). From 
which it follows, Pregunta quien puede y responde quien sabe ("He who 
can, asks; he who knows, answers"}. Only those with the socially-
recognized power to do so can question authority; only those with 
socially recognized authority can reply. Hence, authority can never exe-
cute or block acts that belong to power; it can only endorse or condemn 
them. Of course, whether power actually enjoys the assent of authority 
may be uncertain, as can the degree of power's social recognition. In any 
case, the modifier "legitimate" cannot logically be applied to authority; 
authority is authority, and it never depends on power. Only power can be 
legitimate or illegitimate. 33 
If the norm is power's strict separation from authority, the tragic 
drama of our age, according to D'Ors, has been the state's ascription of 
authority to itself, a move that entailed replacing legitimacy with mere 
legality. The state, as the source of positive law, in • effect claims to 
legitimate itself, as did the agents of the state established by the French 
Revolution. As the nineteenth century wore on, liberal democratic 
regimes dropped all references to legitimacy except as pure constitutional 
legality. The trend culminated in Hans Kelsen's famous justification of 
political power as purely a matter oflaw, which alone bestows legitimacy. 
As a result, ·modern democracies struggle to make a coherent appeal to 
legitimacy. For example, a particular government is said to be "illegitim-
ate" when it lacks popular support and can only govern \;)y force. But 
33 Alvaro D 'Ors, Ensayos de teoria politica (Pamplona : Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 
1979), pp. 85, 91-2, 112, 151-2; idem, La violencia y el orden (Madrid: Editorial 
Criterio-Libros, 1998), pt. 2•, cap. l. An excellent introduction to D'Ors' thought is 
Frederick D . Wilhelmsen, "The Political Philosophy of Alvaro D'ors," The Political 
Science Reviewer, vol. 20 (Spring 1991), pp. 144-85. The distinction among power, 
legitimacy and authority demanded by D 'Ors is also asserted by Jean Elshtain, 
Sovereignry: God, State and Self (New York: Basic Books; 2008), pp . 12-13 . For a 
similar interpretation see Hannah Arendt, "What Was Authority?" in: Carl J . Friedrich 
(ed.), Authoriry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp . 81-112 . 
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what proportion of the population does it take to make a government 
illegitimate? German and Italian totalitarian regimes were at one time 
massively popular; a majority of Germans and Italians never came close 
to resisting them. But none of us today would qualify either regime as 
legitimate. The only alternative, it would seem, is to seek legitimacy in 
the authority of the natural law tradition or in divine law. Indeed, D'Ors 
asserted, the notion of legitimacy as something greater than law has 
persisted, and with it the lingering assumption that only a power that 
complies with that "something" merits obedience. 34 
· A more immediate · consideration, for the purposes of this essay, is to 
notice how the failure to properly distinguish authority, legitimacy and 
power has emptied "legitimacy" of any substantive meaning, even 
though we cannot seem to let the concept go. In the mid-1970s, "legit-
imacy" was already "pretty unfashionable" among scholars, wrote Peter 
H . Smith at the time. He argued that "the cultural determinants of 
politics" (by which he meant legitimacy) were being overlooked by 
investigators who erroneously assumed that Latin America must be 
evolving toward democracy. 35 By then, scholars of the Latin American 
state were already displaying a nearly exclusive interest in power and its 
distribution, in the belief that power alone authorizes and legitimates, or 
that legitimacy, if it exists at all, is too hard to define and impossible to 
measure, or that legitimacy discourses are nothing but the cunning 
dissimulations of power holders. 36 Richard Morse stood practically alone 
among prominent historians of Latin America in conceiving the core 
34 D'Ors, Ensayos de teoria politica, pp. 151-2, 135-46; D'Ors' claim that liberalism can give 
no convincing account of the source of its authority because modern democratic regimes 
have in effect swallowed authority is shared by Stephen R L. Clark, Civil Peace and 
Sacred Order (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 82, 92. Cognate arguments can be 
found in Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political 
Theology (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 30-1, 49, 89-90; Carl J. Friedrich, 
Tradition and Authority (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), ch. 8; Jacques Maritain, 
Man and the State (London: Hollis & Carter, 1954), pp . 115-20; Bertrand de Jouvenel, 
Sovereignty: An Inquiry imo the Political Good (University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
pp. 29-33. . 
35 Peter H . Smith, "Political Legitimacy in Spanish America," in: Richard Graham and 
Peter H . Smith (eds.), New Approaches w Latin American History (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1974), pp. 225-55, here at pp . 227; 254. "Dominance" and "achievement-
expercise" were his proposals for Latin American-type legitimacies. 
36 For examples, see Derek Sayer, "Everyday Forms of State Formation: Some Dissident 
Remarks on 'Hegemony'," in: Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (eds.), Everyday 
Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 367-78, here at p. 375; Alan Knight, 
"The Modern Mexican State: Theory and Practice," in: Miguel Angel Centeno and 
Fernando Lopez-Alves (eds.), The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin 
America (Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 177-218; idem, "Weapons and Arches 
in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape," in : Joseph and Nugent, Everyday Forms of 
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problem of the region's political history to have been the search for the 
legitimization of power. 37 Occasionally, the fog dissipated enough to 
suggest once again that something about legitimacy seemed important 
even if we could not quite put our finger on it. A contemporary example 
is the UNDP's above-cited 2004 study, "Democracy in Latin America," 
whose authors argued that Latin Americans had to solve their govern-
ability crisis by trying to "build a new legitimacy for the State." The study 
went on to mention "legitimacy" 22 times over the course of its 288 pages 
but without once either probing its meaning or discussing the conditions 
that might give rise to the construction of a "new legitimacy." 38 
About midway between Smith .'s vain attempt to revive the study of 
legitimacy and the UNDP project, the Brazilian Francisco C. Weffort 
observed that the entire half-century sj.nce the 1930s had constituted "a 
crisis of legitimacy" in Latin America. In a. poignant and evidently 
personal reminiscence, W effort wrote that one had to have lived . through 
that crisis in order to · know precisely just how truly it was a crisis of 
legitimacy, to have shared the general intuition that some fundamental 
deficiency was ravaging the state, or society, or both at once. "Through-
out that period it was (and remains) a characteristic feature of the Latin 
American mind to know that things were (and indeed remain) 'mis-
taken,' whatever the place and whatever the reasons for the 'mistake'." 
W effort identified the effects of the "mistake" in terms much like the 
characteristics I earlier associated with the "improvisational state": to 
Weffort, it was "a chronic instability apparent in the continual threats 
of coups d'etat and in political phenomena such as populism and military 
interventions. "39 
In Weffort's account, "legitimacy" seems to be what that state would 
have acquired had some fundamental, yet unnamed and rather mysteri-
ous defect or "mistake" been corrected. "Something" was out of place, 
or missing entirely, or its nature perverted. The result was Weffort's 
"chronic instability," or my "crisis of order and legitimacy,'' or 
O'Donnell's "severe incompleteness of the state." 
State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994), pp. 24--66, here at pp. 42-3, 60-2; Florencia Mallon, 
"Reflections on the Ruins: Everyday Forms of State Formation in Nineteenth-Century 
Mexico," in: Joseph and Nugent, Everyday Fonns of State Fomzation, pp. 69-106, here at 
pp. 70-1. . 
37 Richard M . Morse, New World Soundings: Culture and Ideology in the Americas (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 127. 
38 United Nations Development Programme, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a 
Citizens' Democracy (New York : United Nations Development Programme, 2005) . 
39 Francisco C. Weffort, "The Dilemmas of Political Legitimacy," CEPAL Review, no. 35 
(August 1988), pp. 127-42, here at p. 132. 
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That "something," that curious omission or deficiency, I propose, is 
precisely a way of gauging legitimacy that descends from a socially recognized 
principle of authority, or even from some divergent methods and principles 
of authority that nevertheless overlap in a complementary way, defusing the 
potential for conflict among them. When understood as a quality that 
depends on authority, the concept oflegitimacy can be cured of its vaguely 
intuitive status and acquire the analytical strength it is supposed to possess. 
To affirm or contest the legitimacy of a given regime or administration is to 
deploy some norm or cluster of norms dictated by a particular authority. To 
understand the source of consensus or conflict driven by rival claims of 
legitimacy, it is not enough to know that one band contests the legitimacy 
or "right to rule" of a regime, and another one defends it. We need to go 
further, and try to identify the nature of the authority that each band has 
chosen as the source of the norms or principles that guides its judgment of 
the regime's legitimacy. In weighing the legitimacy of a regime, in other 
words, we find that people believe in one authority or another, and it is 
precisely the failure to find a way of harmonizing that diversity of beliefs in 
one or another authority that accounts, in large part, for Latin America's 
interminable "crisis of legitimacy." To repeat: Authority, on this view, 
cannot itself be either legitimate or illegitimate, nor can it ever exercise 
power itself. What authority does require is social recognition, and it is 
precisely the absence of a more or less unitary, socially recognized principle 
of authority that distinguishes the Latin American state formation process. 
To frame the prol.Jlem in these terms is to opt for a mode of explanation 
that grants priority (as Smith sought to do) to the realm of culture in state 
formation, over against the prevailing preferences for materialist, institu-
tionalist, rational-choice and power-based modes. None of the latter, as 
Rae argued, can excavate the deep sources of state formation. To under-
stand just why people choose the "interests" that dominate such explan-
ations requires an investigation of the moral content of their choices. 40 In a 
similar vein, Lehman identified culture as the primary site for the study of 
"political legitimations," which he argued (following Berger and 
Luckmann) are always constituted by values (rules of the game) that in 
turn require the enunciation of some core moral principles. Partisans and 
powerholders alike apply moral imperatives - the first, to accuse or acclaim 
the powerholders; the second, to justify their own power.4 1 
40 Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 24-44, 304-305. The primary field of variation in this study was the 
definition of insider-outsider boundaries for determining the membership of a polity. 
41 Edward W. Lehnian, The Viable Polity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 
pp. 141-2. 
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And so we ask, which authority principles were at play in a given 
society, at a given time? How were they deployed to test the legitimacy 
of a particular political program, regime or government? How did conten-
tion over the rightful sources or principles . of authority shape the four 
most obvious and persistent symptoms of state incompetence: corrup-
tion on an Olympian scale, intolerably high levels of public violence and 
disorder, widespread indifference to the rule of · faw and political 
instability? 
The Search for Authority in Latin American State Making 
If an enfeeblement of traditional understandings of authority swept the 
West, as D'Ors averred, the cultural ~d political codes available to their 
assailants, their defenders and other actors varied immensely as between, 
say, Britain and the United States, on the ,one hand, and New Spain or 
Spain itself. In this way, following Eisenstadt, the same general move-
ment could yield distinctive outcomes in particular places. If authority 
was somehow reconstructed or refounded in a non-traditional guise in 
the first group of countries; in much of Latin America the process of 
reconstructing authority that should have begun after 1808 remains 
unfinished. In showing how this might have happened, I would· like. to 
outline the ways in which political authority had been understood before 
the crisis of 1808, how it had already been challenged well before 1808 by 
the monarchy itself, and how these conflicting interpretations were then 
seized on, further reinterpreted and applied in competitive ways in the 
post-independence republican context. 
Basically, the peoples of the new republics divided over three different 
conceptions oflegitimating authority. The first was the traditional, medi-
eval belief ("translation" theory) that authority originates naturally or by 
divine ordination in the body politic, which freely decides to endow the 
power to govern upon whomever it regards as the most qualified person 
or group. The ruler thus holds power by a free act of the people, who can 
in turn take away that power if it is misused, and transfer it to some more 
qualified ruler. In translation theory, the consent of the political commu-
nity is the defining act. Monarchs with absolutist pretensions gradually 
defined a deviant "designation theory" under which the body politic acts, 
not freely, but under Providential direction, to designate the ruler whose 
distinction as a leader is so evident that he must have been divinely 
chosen for leadership. Here, the political community is duty-bound to 
make an irrevocable designation. The third approach was the proto-
democratic ideology ("liberalism") of the Age of Revolution, into which 
the Hispanic republics were born. Liberal ideology dearly owed a good 
Beyond Mere War 261 
deal to translation theory, but it also challenged that theory by rejecting 
the divine-law basis of authority by absolutizing the will of the majority 
(Rousseau) or the state (Hobbes), and its disregard of the traditionally 
conceived ends of state power - namely, the protection of the common 
good. To the liberals, the state was not defined according to any divinely 
ordered natural "end" but by history, which is to say, by purely human 
goals and desires. 42 
An underlying • clash of "translation," "designation" and "liberal" 
conceptions of legitimate political authority not only shaped political 
conflict in Latin America but kept it going, fueled in part by the fact that 
it followed the destruction of a manifestly incompetent and corrupt 
monarchy that had defined its authority in terms of a divine-right 
"designation" theory . Liberals drew on aspects of both translation and 
designation theories of authority to legitimate their rule. Some conser-
vatives, horrified by the specter of democracy, resorted to the "designa-
tion" thesis to defend divine-right monarchy. Liberals eventually did 
likewise, but now to defend a quasi-absolutist, authoritarian state 
governed by liberal principles eventually corrupted by utilitarianism, 
positivism and social Darwinism. Many others -,- perhaps the most 
authentically "traditional" elements of society - upheld the "transla-
tion" view, along with its distinctive teleology and natural- or divine-law 
premises. 
Three contemporary historians have grappled with the implications of 
these understandings for nineteenth-century politics in Latin America . 
0 . Carlos Stoetzer documented a heterodox argument in favor of a 
widespread "translationist" understanding of authority in Hispanic 
America that, he further claimed, was deployed to justify the rebellion 
against the Bourbon monarchy. Stoetzer made much of the clash 
between the designationist outlook of the late Bourbons and the transla-
tionist premises of the Spanish Americans, but he confined his analysis 
strictly to the independence wars . Austen Ivereigh distinguished an 
"ecumenical" liberalism (strongly translationist) from a "monistic" 
(more designationist, and thus absolutistic) liberalism. lvereigh, unlike 
Stoetzer , recognized that pre-independence assumptions about author-
ity remained in play for some decades after independence, but omitted 
42 Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 [I 945)), pp . 235, 430-3, 443- 50, 454-6, 459, 
460-4, 469- 73. Similarly, conflict over opposing notions of auctoritas - an "ascending" 
theory that located authority in the people, and a "descending" notion that associated it 
with a supreme being- was the central theme of Walter Ullmann, A History of Political 
Thought; the Middle Ages (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965). Ullmann further argued 
that these distinctions persisted into modernity at pp . 7 and 229-30 . 
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any speculation about how they might have persisted over the long 
term, and limited his analysis to church-state matters. In a series of 
works, our third historian, Fran~ois-Xavier Guerra, not only tracked 
(like Stoetzer) the impact of distinctive beliefs about authority from the 
late Bourbon period through the independence wars but went on to 
document their presence well into the nineteenth century. Guerra also 
proposed that the conflicts over the nature of the appropriate legitimat-
ing authority that animated the independence movement and the polit-
ics of the nineteenth century persisted throughout the twentieth century 
as well. A liberal view of the nation as a voluntary association of equal 
individuals (among whom sovereignty collectively resided) never ceased 
to clash with a more traditional understanding of authority that · des-
cended from translation theory, in which sovereignty rested in a mosaic 
of concrete social and geographical corporate entities rather than.indi-
vidual persons. On the second view, legitimacy is conveyed by means of 
pacts and the enunciation of special privileges, rights and duties associ-
ated with the group. Pactismo, or the habit of governing through special 
arrangements with distinctive groups, in effect lived on to disrupt the 
liberal project. 43 
One result was the consolidation of personalistic and patrimonial 
institutions. In the absence of a consensus on the source of authority, 
the right to rule was increasingly evaluated in highly personalistic terms. 
Hence caudillismo, patrimonialism, patron-clientage ~ animated and 
reshaped after independence under the influence of modernity. Today 
they remain symptomatic expressions ofthe absence of a socially recog-
nized moral authority capable of providing the criteria necessary for 
weighing legitimacy. Thus, the tendency toward crisis, violent disorder 
43 0. Carlos Stoetzer, The Scholastic Roots of the Spanish American Re'IJolution (New York: 
Fordham University. Press, · 1979); Austen Ivereigh, · "Introduction: . The Politics of 
Religion in an Age of Revival," in: Austen Ivereigh (ed.), The Politics of Religion in an 
Age of Re'IJival: Studws in Nineteenth-Centuiy Europe and Latin America (London: Institute 
of Latin American Studies, 2000), pp. 1-21, here at pp. 13-15; Fran~ois Xavier Guerra, 
"De la politica antigua a la politica modema: La revolucion de la ·soberania," in: Fran~ois 
Xavier Guerra and Annick Lemperiere (eds.), Los espacios publicos en Iberoamerica: 
Ambigiiedades y problemas, siglos XVIII-XIX (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, 1998), pp. 109-39, here at pp. 135, 139; idem, Modemidad e 
independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispanicas (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 
1992), pp. 51- 3, 72- 9; idem, "The Spanish-American Tradition of Representation 
and Its European Roots," Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 26, no. 1 (February 
1994), pp. 1-35, here at pp. 34-5. See a comparative treatment of the principle of 
consent in the independence movements of Latin America and the United States by 
Jose Carlos Chiaramonte, "The Principle of Consent in Latin and Anglo-American 
Independence," Journal of Latin American Studws, vol. 36, no. 3 (August 2004), 
pp . 563-86, here at pp. 577-82. 
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and indifference to the rule of law. The authority-'centered nature of the 
crisis also clarifies one of the most glaring features of Latin American 
political conflict: the ubiquity and persistence of a . discourse that 
demonizes and violently condemns the political enemy while associat-
ing him with imminent catastrophe. Precisely because the underlying 
disagreement concerned the appropriate source of moral authority, 
there was no place for a political enemy but in jail, exile or a coffin. If 
mere interests were at . stake, a rational choice would have dictated 
compromise . But m a moral battle, especially one over the identity of 
authority competent to judge legitimacy, compromise is rarely an 
option: 
Disagreements over basic beliefs about the source of the authority 
capable of endowing legitimacy seeded and sustained a long-term crisis 
of legitimacy in Latin America . The range and diversity of such beliefs, 
as well as their contradictory character and thus their potential for 
conflict, exceeded the limits of the threefold taxonomy of authority that 
prevailed in the early decades of independence. Their range and diver-
sity cannot be adequately documented within the scope of a single 
essay. A few examples will have to suffice to illustrate the endurance 
and ubiquity of, first, a crisis of legitimacy; second, allusions (usually 
indirectly or implicitly, and perhaps not even consciously) to diverse 
authorities in order to justify contradictory legitimacy norms; and third, 
the demonization and violent condemnation of an enemy associated 
with imminent catastrophe. All three characteristics are eventually syn-
thesized in a rhetoric of "national salvation" - a phrase that turns up 
repeatedly in the political history of Latin America. 
Such discourses were frequently directed against members of an 
opposing faction of the same party or political band. The Mexican 
Gen. Porfirio Diaz' "Plan de la Noria" (November 1871) can be taken 
as a convenient example. In justifying his revolt against the just-elected 
government of Benito Juarez, a fellow liberal whose administration 
Diaz himself had honorably served, Diaz referred to the liberal-
controlled National Congress as ''a chamber of courtesans" and "a 
cataclysm of perversion and . immorality"; he accused the Juarez 
administration of having forgotten "the laws and practices of Christian 
civilization" and of turning the republic into "an immoral and corrupt 
farce." Diaz's "Pl .an" concluded: "Let us fight, then, for the cause of 
the people and the people will be the sole owner of its triumph." He 
pledged "the observance of the constitution" and asserted "that no 
citizen should impose himself and perpetuate himself in the exercise 
of power, and this will be the last revolution." Of course, Diaz would 
go on to violate, more spectacularly than any president in Mexican 
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history, the very promises at the heart of his revolt. 44 But note how he 
appealed to traditional values and Christian virtues - transcendent 
authority - in justifying the overthrow of rulers invariably character-
ized as "tyrants" - a move specifically authorized by the medieval and 
early modern "translation" theorists. 
In 1932, another caudillo, Augusto Sandino, appealed to transcendent 
authority when he called for Nicaragua's freedom from occupation of the 
U.S. Marines - a freedom attainable "only by bullets, and at the cost of 
our own blood, we have said, and that nest of political scoundrels who 
are · fighting each other to take over the whip of the invader . will be 
annihilated by their own guilt in a not too distant future. "45 The guerrilla 
leader's authority for his challenge to the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan 
state emerged from a self-concocted synthesis of traditional Christianity, 
magic and paganism. Sandino saw himself as the divinely chosen "war-
ring messiah-prophet" of the imminent redemption of the entire planet, 
not just .Nicaragua. 46 
Three decades later, Sandino's Marxist epigones organized the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional to forcefully remove another tyran-
nical government. Like Sandino, they claimed exclusive leadership of a 
redemptive millenarian movement whose quest for a legitimate govern-
ment originated in their belief in semi-mystical authority. The Sandi-
nistas, as they styled themselves, called their authority "scientific," for it 
was "history" that justified their challenge to a regime they regarded as 
illegitimate. Professing faith in the "historical character of the proletariat 
as the most revolutionary and fundamental class for the maximum 
development of our liberation process," they identified themselves as 
the historically denominated "vanguard" and thus the sole legitimate 
organizer of the proletariat in both its violent conquest of power and its 
subsequent administration of power. 47 Unlike Sandino's, their move-
ment triumphed, with the collapse ofthe dictatorship of Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle in 1979. 
44 For more examples of the intensely moralistic and ~olent tone of political rivalry and an 
extended analysis of political demonization, see Holden, Armies without Nations, 
pp. 31- 3. 
45 Augusto Cesar Sandino, Pensamienw politico (Caracas : Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1988) , 
p . 445 . 
4 6 Marco Aurelio Navarro-Genie, Augusto "Cesar" Sandino: Messiah of Light and Tntrh 
(Syracuse Uni versity Press, 2002), pp. 92, 142, 146-57 . 
47 Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional, "Plataforma general politico-militar del 
FSLN para el triunfo de . la revoluci6n popular sandinista," in: Dennis Gilbert and 
David Block (eds.), Sandinistas: Key Docitments!Documentos Glaves (Ithaca: Latin 
American Studies Program, Cornell University, 1977) . 
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In his attempt to lead a socialist revolution from the elective office of 
the presidency of Chile, Salvador Allende likewise identified his ultimate 
authority as "history," and the proletariat as its instrument --, a discovery 
he attributed to a synthesis of freemasonry and "the humanism of all ages 
and particularly ... Marxist humanism." Just as "history" led first Russia 
and then China to blaze the trail toward socialism, in 1970 "once again, 
history has permitted a break with the · past" in Chile. It was to the 
authority of history, as revealed by his Marxist-humanist-Masonic ideol-
ogy, that Allende appealed in justifying the legitimacy of the regime he 
sought to build in the name of the proletariat: "a democratic, national, 
revolutionary and popular Government which will open the road to 
socialism" and to the creation ofa "new man" in a "classless society." 48 
In 1973, the legitimacy of Allende's government would in turn be chal-
lenged by the country's armed forces. In removing what they called "an 
illegitimate, immoral government" from power, Chile's military leaders 
appealed to the constitution and the country 's laws. They acted, they 
said, "before God and history," out of a "moral duty" imposed on them 
by the majority of the population. Two years later, Gen. ·Augusto .Pino-
chet, the leader of the coup and now the unelected president of Chile, 
elaborated on the contradictory sources of authority at play in the crisis of 
1970- 73: "The existence and propagation of Leninism-Marxism in the 
world today represents the destruction of the basic moral foundations 
from which the Western and Christian civilizations derive . . . . The workl 
today faces an unprecedented form of war" between • Christianity and 
communism. "I devotedly implore Our Holy Lord," Pinochet con-
cluded, to keep Chile's ~'flame of liberty" from burning out. 4 9 
Finally, contemporary Latin American political life forces us to con-
sider yet another kind of belief about the source of legitimating author-
ity that has been seen throughout the post-independence history of the 
region. Where an office of state is understood to be what I described 
above as an opportunity to distribute plunder and to dispense violence 
in order to protect plunder rights, there is no interest ·in achieving 
anything "for" the state, for to occupy any given office of state is simply 
to possess an instrument for . personal enrichment. The state's grand 
purpose is still the abatement of disorder through lawgiving and 
48 Regis Debray, The Chilean Revolucion: Conversations with All ende (New York : Pantheon 
Books, 1971), pp . 65,115 ; 117,119,170,174. 
49 Government Junta of the Armed Forces and Carabineros of Chile, "Order of the Day 
Number 5," in: Brian Loveman and Thomas M . Davies Jr. (eds.), The Policies of 
Ancipolilics (Lincoln : Univer sity of Nebra ska Press, 1978), pp . 198-9 ; Augusto 
Pinochet, "Speech," in: Loveman and Davies Jr., The Politics of An cipolitics, pp. 204, 
205,207. . 
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coercion, but only insofar as disorder interferes with the aim of self-
enrichment. I call it the "entrepreneurial state." Nothing, therefore, 
about this kind of "modern" state can be explained by Tilly's theory of 
state expansion, with its neat Weberian assumptions about war making, 
taxation, bargaining and citizenship. Still, the contemporary 
Guatemalan state, say, is a modern state, and like every other human 
artefact, it is the product of ideas :;ibout what it ought to be for, or what 
makes it "legitimate," a status that in turn seeks justification in the 
name of some kind of authority. To those who have accommodated 
themselves to the entrepreneurial state, a legitimate state is one that 
affords office holders and their dependents the freedom to function as 
entrepreneurs. 50 The "authorizing" principle of this concept of legitim-
acy might be moral nihilism, in which values themselves are thought to 
be arbitrary and justice is therefore a· fiction. This principle competes 
with, but frequently defeats, more traditiopal, justice-oriented theories 
of legitimacy put forward in countries such as Guatemala by some 
political parties, non-governmental organizations, social movements, 
and religious authorities as well as individuals whose notion of citizen-
ship presumes a different sort of authority principle (perhaps one of 
those mentioned above) and thus a different standard of legitimacy. 
In Latin America, a dynamic diversity of rival moral authorities, and 
hence a diversity of legitimacies, established the . basic conditions for 
the rise of weak and inefficient states, endless violence and indiffer-
ence to the rule of law. I identified three main alternative authorities 
(those linked to liberalism and to translation and designation theory) 
that first emerged during the period of the independence movements, 
but it is the very inventiveness of the ongoing search for authorities (as 
the examples just given reveal) that merits attention at the moment. 
New or reformed state institutions can achieve little in the absence of a 
socially-recognized authority - one derived from an axiology conceived 
variously as secular or supernatural, a composite of the two, or as 
stemming from the natural law tradition - that is capable of bestowing 
legitimacy on a state, regime or government. Without such recogni-
tion, state institutions are in no · position to derive any long-term 
strength from warfare in any of its guises. War is a feature of Latin 
American political life that accelerated, not the formation of successful 
states, as Tilly argued for Europe, but rather state deformation and 
failure. The fatal impairment of the Tilly thesis is its reification of the 
state and the corollary of a behavioristic determinism ("wars make 
50 Described as a "transactional model" by Briscoe, "A Criminal Bargain," p . 17. 
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states") entailed by reification. This essay has documented the sterility 
of that approach in the Latin American context. Collective entities like 
states are constituted by individual persons and apart from the acts of 
persons, they have no independent reality. 51 This is the principle 
I have tried to deploy in showing how personal commitments to a 
diversity of comprehensive beliefs about the sources of moral authority 
can explain state instability and incompetence more satisfactorily than 
the Tilly thesis. 
51 See the discussion of Paul Ricoeur's reasoning in opposmon to a Hegelian-style 
hypostasis of the state· and similar entities in Robert Piercey, The Uses of the Past from 
Heidegger to Rorr:y: Doing Philosophy Historically (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 183-6 . 
